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Unresolved Legal Questions Concerning
Operation Inherent Resolve
OREN GROSS*
To start from first principles-the United States complies with the
international law of armed conflict in our military campaign against

ISIL, as we do in all armed conflicts. We comply with the law of
armed conflict because it is the international legal obligation of the
United States; because we have a proud history of standing for the

rule of law; because it is essential to building and maintaining our
international coalition; because it enhances rather than compromises

our military effectiveness; and because it is the right thing to do.'
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INTRODUCTION

Since August 2014, the United States and several of its allies have been embroiled
in military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in Iraq, Syria, and
later, also in Libya. Those military engagements raise a plethora of vexing legal
questions both on the domestic constitutional law plane in the United States2 and on
the international level.
This Article seeks to explore and examine the legal
justifications for the United States's military operations against ISIS under
international law.
Part I sketches the rise of ISIS, and Part II briefly describes the contours of
Operation Inherent Resolve, which was launched by the United States on August 8,

2014 with a series of airstrikes directed against ISIS targets in Iraq before expanding,
a month later, to attacks on ISIS targets in Syria. Part III examines critically the four
main legal justifications put forward in support of the United States's (and its allies')
military operations against ISIS, namely acting in pursuance of Security Council
authorization (in reliance on Security Council Resolution 2249 of 2014), invitation by
the Iraqi government to its friends and allies to intervene militarily in order to defeat
ISIS, claims of humanitarian intervention, and last but not least, arguments that in
pursuing military options, the United States exercises its inherent right for individual
or collective self-defense.

I.

RISE OF ISIS

The origins of ISIS can be traced back to 1999 and the founding of Jamaat al-

Tawhid wa'l-Jihad (JTWJ) by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.' In October 2004, after several
years in which JTWJ was loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda, 4 al-Zarqawi formally
pledged allegiance to that organization and to Osama bin Laden, renaming JTWJ as
al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers (AQI).' However, there continued to be an
"ideological divide" between AQI and al-Qaeda, as "Zarqawi felt that the only way to
save the umma (global Islamic community) from itself was through purging it, whereas
bin Laden's number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, believed that Muslims were not the
problem, but that instead the 'apostate' institutions needed to be changed."' In 2006,
al-Zarqawi established a new terrorist organization, the Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin

(MSM), a collection of "Iraqi insurgent factions .. . with AQI at the top."'

Al-

2. These questions are explored separately in Oren Gross, Fighting ISIS Under the Constitution
(2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
3. Aaron Y. Zelin, The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist
Movement, WASH. INST. NEAR E. POL'Y, June 2014, at 1, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/
Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4B7-XGRF].
4.

Id. at 2; see also JOBY WARRICK, BLACK FLAGS: THE RISE OF ISIS 67-68 (2016) (detailing how al-

Qaeda provided "start-up money" to al-Zarqawi, as al-Zarqawi was identified as someone al-Qaeda could
use to help establish a "presence in the countries of the Levant").
5. Zelin, supra note 3, at 2; see also WARRICK, supra note 4, at 174 ("[T]hree years after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, Zarqawi offered the potential for something that Bin Laden desperately needed: a
win ... [b]y co-opting Zarqawi, al-Qaeda could share the credit for his successes and draw in new energy.").
6.
Zelin, supra note 3, at 3.
7.
Id.
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Zarqawi's death in June 2006 by U.S. airstrike' "invalidated MSM's implied pledge to
bin Lad[e]n."' Within a few months, al-Zarqawi's successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir,
shifted his loyalty to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq
(ISI)." In 2010, al-Baghdadi was killed in "an operation led by Iraqi security forces
with the support of U.S. troops."" He was replaced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who,
in April 2013, changed the organization's name to the Islamic State of Iraq and al2
Sham (ISIS), announcing that it was extended into Syria. Baghdadi went so far as to
assert that al-Zarqawi was never truly loyal to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and
that the purported alliance was "for strategic reasons, and not out of some genuine
devotion or need."13
For its part, al-Qaeda openly disavowed ISIS in February 2014, declaring, "ISIS
is not a branch of the Qaidat al-Jihad [al-Qaeda's official name] group, we have no
organizational relationship with it, and the group is not responsible for its actions. ,14
Part of the reason for the split is that ISIS believes that it -and not the current iteration
of al Qaeda-is the "true heir of bin Laden's al-Qaeda."" There were also deep
ideological differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda responsible for the groups' split.
As an example, al-Qaeda had deep misgivings regarding the "beheadings and other
shock-theater tactics" used by ISIS."*
In June 2014, ISIS declared itself a Caliphate (Islamic state)," claiming that its
own leader, al-Baghdadi, was the spiritual leader of all Islam.'" Since then ISIS and
other terrorist organizations pledging allegiance to the caliphate have established
provinces in Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya,
Algeria, and Nigeria.' 9

8. Ellen Knickmeyer & Jonathan Finer, Insurgent Leader AI-Zarqawi Killed in Iraq, WASH. POST
2 006
6
06080
(June 8, 2006, 5:57 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/0 /08/AR
0114.html [https://perma.cc/RE47-M3NB].
9. Zelin, supra note 3, at 3.
10. Id.
11. Waleed Ibrahim, Al Qaeda's Two Top Iraq Leaders Killed in Raid, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2010, 4:25
9
2
6
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-alqaeda-idUSTRE 3I3CL 010041 [https://perma.cc/
VCQ2-RZXA].
12. Zelin, supra note 3, at 4.
13. WARRICK, supra note 4, at 283.
14. Zelin, supra note 3, at 5.
15. Id. at 5-6.
16. WARRICK, supra note 4, at 283-84.
17. Karen Yourish et al., Where ISIS Has Directedand InspiredAttacks Around the World, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/map-isis-attacks-aroundthe-world.html [https://perma.cc/575B-VFPK].
18. Adam Withnall, Iraq Crisis: What Is a Caliphate?, INDEPENDENT (June 30, 2014),
72
100.html [https://
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-crisis-what-is-a-caliphate-95
Ottoman Empire
the
was
caliphate
recognized
widely
last
the
that
(noting
perma.cc/MHG4-C3NK]
caliphate, which ended in the early 20th century).
19. See Karen Yourish et al., How Many People Have Been Killed in ISIS Attacks Around the World,
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/25/world/map-isis-attacks-aroundthe-world.html [https://perma.cc/6FXU-HW4K] (demonstrating on a map that ISIS has declared provinces
in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria and that IS conducts
regular military operations in Iraq and Turkey).
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Nowhere was ISIS's expansion and reach as wide as in Iraq and Syria. In June
2016, the United Nations Human Rights Council concluded that "Islamic State forces
have committed genocide and other war crimes in a continuing effort to exterminate
the Yazidi religious minority in Syria and Iraq." 2 0 These crimes have included "mass
killings of Yazidi men and boys who refused to convert to Islam,. . . [with diozens of
mass graves ... uncovered in areas recaptured from [ISIS.]",21 ISIS has also committed
brutal acts of rape and sexual slavery,22 thrown homosexuals off of buildings,23 engaged
in torture," forced marriages,' detonated bombs in civilian centers,26 and carried out
attacks targeting children.27
Raqqa, one of the largest cities in Syria, was taken by ISIS in January 2014 and
made into the capital of the caliphate.2 8 In Iraq, ISIS captured the city of Fallujah in
the same month, with the Anbar province becoming "a battleground" that spring. 29
Five months later, the cities of Mosul and Tikrit were seized "in a blitz offensive."o
ISIS continued to expand its reach in Iraq, "seiz[ing] the districts of Sinjar, Tel Afar
and the Ninewa Plains" in August 2014.31

20. See Nick Cumming-Bruce, ISIS Committed Genocide Against Yazidis in Syria and Iraq, U.N. Panel
Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/middleeast/isis-genocideyazidi-un.html [https://perma.cc/HBC9-2ZTT].
21. Id.
22. Rukmini Callimachi, ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html
[https://perma.cc/
T43F-P8KB].
23. Isaac Chotiner,
The ISIS Correspondent, SLATE
(July 12, 2016, 5:45
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/interrogation/2016/07/rukmini-callimachithe-new-york
timesisisreporterdiscusses her-beat.html [https://perma.cc/6DH3-Y2CN] ("[T]he ISIS ideology is a
perfect place for somebody who is homophobic. This an ideology of a group of people that are throwing
homosexuals off of buildings in Iraq and Syria as punishment for what they consider to be their devious
sexuality.").
24. William Booth & Aaso Ameen Shwan, Iraqis Find Evidence of Torture by Islamic State in Mass
Grave nearMosul, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/iraqisfind-evidence-of-torture-by-islamic-state-in-mass-grave-near-mosul/2016/11/08/989c9dc4-a521-11e6-ba4653db57ffle351_story.html?utm-term=.408968521a8b [https://perma.cc/NB2A-N7BA].
25. Iraq: Sunni Women Tell of ISIS Detention, Torture, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 20, 2017, 1:01 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/20/iraq-sunni-women-tell-isis-detention-torture
[https://perma.cc/
ER7W-XBDC] ("Fighters from the Islamic State ... are arbitrarily detaining, ill-treating, torturing, and
forcibly marrying Sunni Arab women and girls .... ).
26. See WARRICK, supra note 4, at 285 ("ISIS dispatched suicide bombers into sports arenas and
community soccer games as well as mosques, caf6s, and markets.").
27. Id. ("Even Iraqis inured to bloodshed expressed shock when an ISIS recruit drove an explosivesladen truck into an elementary-school playground ... in October 2013, killing thirteen children . . . ").
28. ISIL Recaptures Raqqa from Syria's Rebels: Al-Qaeda-linked Group Take the Northern City After
Fierce Fighting with a Loose Coalition of Rebel Groups, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 14, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/isil-recaptures-raqqa-from-syrias-rebels-2014114201917

453586.html [https://perma.cc/42DB-W7HG].
29. U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Iraq in the Light ofAbuses Committed by the So-Called
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Associated Groups, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/18 (Mar. 27,2015).
30. Id.
31. Id. para. 5.
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In early 2015, ISIS became a truly globalized terrorist organization. Since then,
more than 1,200 people outside of Iraq and Syria have been killed in attacks
coordinated or inspired by ISIS.3 2 These terrorist attacks have included:
*

January 2015: "A series of simultaneous bombings targeting
security facilities in the Sinai killed at least 26 people," with ISIS
claiming responsibility. 3

*

February 2015: In Libya, ISIS claimed responsibility "for three car
bombs that killed at least 38 people."3

*

March 2015: A series of suicide attacks on mosques throughout
Yemen took the lives of at least 130 citizens.

*

April 2015: In Sinai, Egypt, "[ISIS] carried out three separate
attacks on Egyptian security forces .. . including bombing a police
station," killing at least 12 people.

*

May 2015: ISIS claimed responsibility "for a suicide bombing
during midday prayer at a Shiite mosque in eastern Saudi Arabia"
that killed at least 21 people and injured more than 120 others."

*

June 2015: A series of car bombings in Sana, Yemen killed at least
30 people.

*

June 2015: An ISIS gunman killed at least 38 people, "most of
them British tourists," at a resort in Tunisia.

32. Yourish, supra note 17.
33. David D. Kirkpatrick & Merna Thomas, Bomb Attacks at Security Sites in Sinai Kill at Least 26,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/world/middleeast/bombings-of-securityfacilities-in-sinai-kill-at-least-26.html [https://perma.cc/TK28-MYNH].
34. David D. Kirkpatrick, Ties to Islamic State Cited by Group in Libya Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/21/world/middleeast/militants-claiming-isis-ties-say-they-carried2015),
out-libya-bombings.html [https://perma.cc/B7RB-6YWY].
35. Mohammed Ali Kalfood et al., Suicide Attacks at Mosques in Yemen Kill More Than 130, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/world/middleeast/suicide-attacks-at-shiitemosques-in-yemen.html [https://perma.cc/Q4U2-BB2N].
36. Kareem Fahim & Merna Thomas, Sinai Group Kills Officers in Bombings, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/world/middleeast/sinai-group-kills-officers-in-bombings.html
2015),
[https://perma.cc/Q5CU-TMNX].
37. David D. Kirkpatrick, ISIS Claims Responsibilityfor Bombing at Saudi Mosque, N.Y. TIMES (May
22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/world/middleeast/suicide-bombing-saudi-arabia-shiitessunnis-yemen-mosque.html [https://perma.cc/9JC7-XMUN].
38. Shuaib Almosawa & Saeed Al-Batati, ISIS Claims Responsibilityfor Deadly Bombings in Yemen,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/world/middleeast/isis-claims2015),
(June 17,
N.Y. TIMES
responsibility-for-deadly-bombings-in-yemen.html [https://perma.ccCIP6-6T87].
39. Farah Samti & Carlotta Gall, Tunisia Attack Kills at Least 38 at Beach Resort Hotel, N.Y. TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/worldlafrica/gunmen-attack-hotel-in-sousse2015),
26,
(June
tunisia.html [https://perma.cc/MQ74-ESUW].

226

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL.

[VOL. 52:2

*

July 2015: A suicide bomber "killed at least 32 people" in
southeastern Turkey. The Turkish government believed the
bomber had ties to ISIS."

*

September 2015: Two bombings at a mosque in Sana, Yemen
"killed at least 25 people . .. during prayers." 1
4

*

October 2015: Bombings at a peace rally in Ankara, Turkey killed
at least 95 people, at the time making it "the deadliest terrorist
attack in modern Turkey's history."42

*

November 2015: ISIS claimed responsibility for bombing a
Russian charter jet, "which killed all 224 people aboard."4 1

*

November 2015: ISIS claimed responsibility for a double suicide
bombing in Beirut, Lebanon that killed "at least 43 people ... and
[wounded] more than 200.""

*

November 2015: Three coordinated attacks in Paris killed at least
130 civilians45 and wounded 352 others."

*

December 2015: A car bombing in Yemen killed a provincial
governor and eight of his bodyguards.47

40. Ceylan Yeginsu, Suicide Bomber in Suruc Is Said to Be a Turk With Possible Ties to ISIS, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/europe/turkey-suruc-bombing.html
[https://perma.cc/PB4F-VXVF].
41. Shuaib Almosawa, Bombings at Mosque in Yemen Kill at Least 25, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/middleeast/sana-yemen-mosque-suicide-attack.html
[https://
perma.cc/9FS3-4W6F].
42. Ceylan Yeginsu & Tim Arango, Explosions During Peace Rally in Ankara, Turkey's Capital, Kill
Scores, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/world/europe/ankara-turkeyexplosion-deaths.html [https://perma.cclYJ9B-2YZM].
43. See David D. Kirkpatrick, ISIS Ally in Egypt Emerges as Key Suspect in Russian Jet Crash, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/world/middleeast/suspects-in-russian-jet-crashrisk-exposing-their-isis-allies-to-a-backlash.html
[https://perma.cc/Q9RH-LC5T] (remarking that the
bombing of the Russian charter jet, which killed all 224 individuals on board, is the responsibility of the Sinai
Province of the Islamic State, a branch of ISIS).
44. See Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, ISIS Claims Responsibility for Blasts That Killed Dozens in
Beirut, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/13/world/middleeast/lebanonexplosions-southern-beirut-hezbollah.html [https://perma.cc/ER2F-Q76P] (identifying ISIS as the group
responsible for an attack in a predominately Shiite neighborhood in Beirut, Lebanon that killed at least 43
people).
45. Jaime Fuller, Paris Attacks Death Toll Rises to 130, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 20, 2015, 3:01 PM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/11/paris-attacks-death-toll-rises-to-130.html
[https://perma.cc/
Q7NQ-SM43].
46. See Adam Nossiter, Aurelien Breeden, & Katrin Bennhold, Three Teams of CoordinatedAttackers
Carried Out Assault on Paris, Officials Say; Hollande Blames ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/paris-terrorist-attacks.html
[https://perma.cc/49XWFMHP] (describing the three coordinated attacks in Paris-beginning with the suicide bomb outside the
gates of a soccer stadium and ending with authorities storming the concert hall-that left 129 dead, 352
wounded, and the international community vowing to come together against ISIS).
47. See Saeed Al-Batati & Kareem Fahim, Car Bomb Kills Governor in Aden, Yemeni Security Official
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/world/middleeast/car-bomb-kills-
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March 2016: Multiple bombings throughout the city of Brussels
killed at least 30 civilians.

*

May 2016: ISIS claimed responsibility for a shooting in Cairo that
claimed the lives of eight plainclothes police officers.4 9

*

June 2016: , The Turkish government attributed a series of
The
bombings at Istanbul's international airport to ISIS.
bombings killed at least 44 people and injured 238 others.

*

July 2016: ISIS claimed responsibility for a truck attack in Nice,
France that killed at least 84 civilians and injured 303 others." ISIS
called the attacker "a soldier of the Islamic State," but authorities
question this claim, as there was "no evidence suggesting the driver
was radicalized, or had even been exposed to the Islamic State's
propaganda."

227

5 2

While the frequency of terror attacks claimed by ISIS has increased over the past
couple of years, recently, the group has been losing significant ground in both Iraq and

Syria."

Indeed, as former President Obama has noted, the weakening of ISIS

"domestically" has directly contributed to the increase in the frequency of terrorist
54
attacks carried out or inspired by the group in Europe and the United States. In July

governor-in-aden-yemeni-security-official-says.html [https:/perna.cc/A9KF-505V] (highlighting the last
of a series of assassinations against Sunnis in Aden, Yemen that left a governor and his eight body guards
dead; al-Qaeda and ISIS are believed to be behind the attacks, with ISIS taking on an increasingly lethal
role and tone).
48. See Alissa J. Rubin, Aurelien Breeden, & Anita Raghavan, Strikes Claimed by ISIS Shut Brussels
and Shake European Security, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/
europe/brussels-airport-explosions.html [https://perma.cc/CBQ2-2ZAT] (reporting that ISIS is responsible
for the bombings that left at least 30 dead and more than 230 wounded at a Brussels airport and subway
station).
49. See Declan Walsh, Ambush Kills 8 Police Officers in .Egypt,. N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/09/world/middleeast/cairo-egypt-policemen-killed.htnml
CCV3-UTDB] (giving an account of the deadly attack in Cairo, which is believed to be an act of ISIS, that
left eight plainclothes police officers in a minibus dead; ISIS's claim of responsibility at the time of this
article's publication was not independently verified).
50. See Ceyland Yeginsu & Rukmini Callimachi, Turkey Says AirportBombers Were from Kyrgyzstan,
Russia and Uzbekistan, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/world/europe/
istanbul-airport-attack-turkey.html [https://perma.cclF3KR-NKB9] (finding that while no group has
claimed responsibility for the attacks at a Turkish airport that produced 44 fatalities, Turkish officials say
ISIS is responsible). According to Turkish officials, the three suicide bombers were from Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, and Uzbekistan; the recruitment of fighters from Central Asian stations is a result of government
suppression against Muslim organizations and widespread poverty. Id.
51. See Alissa J. Rubin & Aurelien.Breeden, ISIS Claims Truck Attacker in France Was Its 'Soldier',
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), http://www.nytines.com/2016/07/17/world/europe/isis-nice-france-attack.html
[https://perma.cc/5X59-UEZK] (exploring ISIS's claim of responsibility for truck attack in Nice, France and
identifying terrorist responsible for the 84 fatalities as a "soldier of the Islamic State").
52. Id.
53. Angela Dewan & Hamdi Alkhshali, Jubilationin Syria's Manbij as ISIS Loses Controlof Key City,
CNN (Aug. 14,2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/13/middleeast/syria-isis-manbij/ [https://perma.cc/VF7KRLNT].
54. Stephen Collinson & Kevin Liptak, Obama: Trump's Warning on Elections is 'Ridiculous', CNN
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and August 2016, the local, U.S.-assisted forces in Iraq and Syria "made significant
progress against ISIL ... [by] tak[ing] key territory from [the group],"" including
Fallujah and the Qarayyah airfield.57 Perhaps most significantly, in January 2017
Iraqi forces, "aided by American air support and military advisors," reclaimed control
of the eastern half of Mosul.-" At the time of this writing, efforts to salvage the entire
city remain ongoing. Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi has announced "[an] Iraqi
offensive to retake the western half of Mosul,"5 9 and on February 18, 2017, "Iraqi
planes dropped millions of leaflets on western Mosul warning residents that the battle
to dislodge [ISIS] was imminent ... [and] told the jihadists to surrender 'or face a fatal
end."'60 U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the
operation, stating "[t]he coalition forces are in support of this operation and we will
continue ... with the accelerated effort to destroy ISIS.""
In Syria, an aerial campaign is being waged against ISIS targets in the city of
Raqqa. On August 12, 2016, a coalition of local forces-backed by U.S. special
operations forces and airstrikes-liberated Manbij, a city in northern Syria, which had
been described by former President Obama as "a gateway for ISI[S] fighters coming
in and terrorists heading out to attack Europe." 62 ISIS had been using the town "as a
hub for recruiting and processing foreign fighters ... [and] for dispatching operatives
across the Turkish border for potential use in external operations."'" The seizure of
the town provides a significant strategic advantage for the coalition fighting ISIS, as it
"essentially blocks a supply route ISIS has between its heartland of Raqqa and
Turkey.""
ISIS leaders have acknowledged the group's weakening position.
Yet, ISIS
continues to control western Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, the group's primary
(Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/04/politics/obama-trump-pentagon-isis/
[https://perma.cc/
U7PZ-UQ4T] ("[T]he decline of ISIL in Syria and Iraq appears to be causing it to shift to ... encouraging
high-profile terrorist attacks, including in the United States.") (quoting former President Barack Obama).
55. Jim Garamone, ISIL Knows It Will Lose, Already Shifting Strategy, Obama Says at Pentagon, U.S.
DEP'T DEF. (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/905447/isil-knows-it-will-losealready-shifting-strategy-obama-says-at-pentagon [https://perma.cc/HKE2-VWY7].
56. Id.
57. Euan McKirdy & Barbara Starr, Ash Carter: U.S. Sending More Troops to Iraq, CNN (July 11,
2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/11/politics/ash-carter-baghdad/ [https://perma.cclDJ4F-D78V].
58. Rick Gladstone, IraqiForces Take Eastern Mosul from Islamic State, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/middleeast/iraq-mosul-isis.html [https://perma.cc/XK5F-Z43V].
59. Colin Dwyer, Iraq Opens Offensive on Western Mosul in New Push to Reclaim ISIS Stronghold,
NPR (Feb. 19, 2017), http://npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/19/516080820/iraq-opens-offensive-onwestern-mosul-in-new-push-to-reclaim-isis-stronghold.
60. Maher Chmaytelli & Isabel Coles, Iraq Launches Offensive on Last Islamic State Stronghold in
Mosul, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2017, 1:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosulidUSKBN15YO60 [https://perma.cc/N7PF-3C24].
61. Id.
62. President Barack Obama, The President's New Conference at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia
(Aug. 4, 2016) (transcript available at the U.S. Government Publishing Office).
63. Dewan & Alkhshali, supra note 53 (quoting, in part, Pentagon Deputy Press Secretary Gordon
Trowbridge).
64. Id.
65. Joby Warrick & Souad Mekhennet, Inside ISIS: Quietly Preparingfor the Loss of the 'Caliphate',
WASH. POST (July 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-isis-quietlypreparing-for-the-loss-of-the-caliphate/2016/07/12/9ala8a02-454b-11e6-8856-f26de2537a9d-story.html?tid
=ajinl [https://perma.cc/Q5HC-6HCU] ("In public messages and in recent actions in Syria, [ISIS's] leaders
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nerve centers." In addition, experts caution that even the destruction of ISIS's
command network and strongholds would not immediately end the group's global
threat since "[ISIS's] highly decentralized nature ensures that it will remain dangerous
for some time to come."

II.

OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

ISIS was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State
Department in May 2014.8 On August 8, with tensions escalating throughout the
summer, President Barack Obama launched operation "Inherent Resolve" with a
series of airstrikes directed against ISIS targets in Iraq. One month later, the scope
70
of the operation expanded and the United States began striking targets in Syria.
The United States has continued to increase the number of its troops dedicated
to fighting ISIS. In April 2016, the BBC reported that the United States was
committing 200 additional special forces troops, bringing the total number of U.S.
personnel deployed in Iraq to about 4,100.7' Additionally, in 2016, the United States
pledged to provide more than $400 million in assistance to Kurdish Peshmerga forces
fighting ISIS in the region.7 2 In July 2016, Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced
another troop increase, adding 560 new U.S. personnel to bring the total number of
deployed personnel in Iraq up to 4,647." CNN reported that this troop increase was
74
to assist the Iraqi troops with the logistics and recapturing of Mosul. Secretary Carter
stated that "[tihese additional U.S. forces will bring unique capabilities to the
campaign and provide critical enabler support to Iraqi forces at a key moment in the
5
fight.""
Throughout 2016, significant goals have been achieved in the fight against ISIS.
In March, U.S. operations in the Middle East killed ISIS's second-in-command, Abd
6
al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli and ISIS's "defense minister," Omar al-Shishani.
These operations were part of the United States' plan to "systematically eliminat[e]
are acknowledging the terrorist organization's declining fortunes on the battlefield while bracing for the
possibility that its remaining strongholds could fall.").
66. Carol E. Lee & Paul Sonne, Barack ObamaSays Islamic State Is Losing Ground Militarily, Turning
More to Terrorism, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/barack-obama-says-islamic4703 48932
[https://perma.cc/B5M3-ZSXR].
state-is-losing-ground-militarily-turning-more-to-terrorism-1
67. Warrick & Mekhennet, supra note 65.
68. Gregory A. Wagner, Warheads on Foreheads: The Applicability of the 9/11 A UMF to the Threat of
ISIL, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 235, 236 (2015).
69. Id. at 237.
70. Eric Posner, Obama Can Bomb Pretty Much Anything He Wants To, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/view-from_chicagol2014/09/war-against-isis-in .syria-Oba
ma-slegal-and-politicaljustifications.html [https://perma.cc/YG27-3CFD].
71. US Extra Troops to Boost Fight againstIS in Iraq, BBC NEWS (Apr. 18,2016), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-36075452 [https://perma.cc/6J3Y-UD3S].
72. Id.
73. McKirdy & Starr, supra note 57.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting the Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter).
76. David Smith, Martin Chulov, & Spencer Ackerman, ISIS Second in Command Killed in US Raid,
Pentagon Says, GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/25/islamic-statesecond-in-command-killed-us-raid-syria [https://perma.cc/AS3V-NU26].
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ISIS's cabinet." 77 In August 2016, the United States began an aerial bombing campaign
against ISIS targets in Libya.78 The Libyan operation has been characterized as "a
sustained offensive against the militant group" that does not have "an end point at this
particular point of time."" The initial focus of the Libya bombings is on targets in
Sirteso with the stated goal to "provide a decisive advantage to the [GNA] attackers
and'help break the stalemate along the fighting fronts in the southern and'western part
of the city."
Actions against ISIS in Iraq and Syria have continued into August 2016.82 As of
January 31, 2017, the United States has spent $11.4 billion on Operation Inherent
Resolve.8 3 As of August 3, 2016, a total of 14,235 strikes have been conducted against
ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria by the United States and its coalition allies.14 These strikes
have collectively destroyed more than 26,000 strategic ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria"
and are estimated to have killed "as many as 45,000 ISIS-linked fighters."8 6 There has
also been increased ground combat between U.S. troops and ISIS fighters. 7
77. Id. (quoting, in part, the Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter) (internal quotation marks onuitted).
78. Alex Emmons, U.S. Says New Bombing Campaign Against ISIS in Libya Has No "End Point at
This ParticularMoment", INTERCEPT (Aug. 1, 2016, 4:35 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/08/01/u-s-saysnew-bombing-campaign-against-isis-in-libya-has-no-end-point-at-this-particular-moment/
[https://
perma.cc/L47D-RKF5]. This was not the first instance of the United States using force against ISIL in Libya.
Al Jazeera reported that "[o]n February 19, the US carried out air strikes on an ISIL camp in Sabratha[,
Libya] in concert with the UK, France and Italy, killing dozens, Tunisians for the most part." Olivier Guitta,
US Starts Its Long-Awaited Anti-ISIL Campaign in Libya, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 2, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/08/starts-long-awaited-anti-isil-campaign-libya160802131907056.html [https://perma.cc/R2LZ-EL2X].
79. Trevor Timm, The US Is Bombing Libya Again. It's a Too-FamiliarVicious Cycle, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 2, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/02/us-bombing-libya-isisstrongholds-vicious-cycle [https://perma.cc/PY44-5SH5].
80. Austin Wright, U.S. Strikes ISIL in its Libyan Stronghold, POLITICO (Aug. 1, 2016, 11:42 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/us-isil-strikes-226505
[https://perma.cc/RUA9-UWB6]; see also
Libya Makes Gains against ISIL in Sirte Fighting, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 8, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/ibya-gains-isil-sirte-fighting-160808152702720.html
[https://perma.cc/L92Z-HXB2] ("Sirte has been an ISIL stronghold since June [2015].").
81. Helene Cooper, U.S. Conducts Airstrikes Against ISIS in Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/us/politics/us-conducts-airstrikes-against-isis-in-libya.html
[https://
perma.cc/6SGG-8CVA]; see also Dewan & Alkhshali, supra note 53 (citing Brett McGurk, the Special
Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, that ISIL "was losing ground in its Libyan
stronghold, Sirte").
82. Military Strikes Continue Against ISIL Terroristsin Syria, Iraq, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. (Aug. 9, 2016),

http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/908760/military-strikes-continue-against-isil-terrorists-insyria-iraq [https://perma.cc/9UBS-TH6T].
83. Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations Against ISIL Terrorists, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.
[hereinafter Operation Inherent Resolve], http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_InherentResolve [https://perma.cc/8FJY-SRWA] (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
84. Lee & Sonne, supranote 66; see also id. (explaining that the coalition includes forces from Australia,
Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United
Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom).
85. OperationInherent Resolve, supra note 83.
86. Nearly 45,000 ISIS-linked FightersKilled in Past 2 Years, US Military Official Says, Fox NEWS
(Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/08/10/nearly-45000-isis-linked-fighters-killed-in-past2-years-us-military-official-says.html [https://perma.cc/S2VK-ZJ9E].
87. See Mark Mazzetti & Helene Cooper, Another Combat Death in IraqMay PresageFuture U.S. Role,
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/us/another-combat-death-in-iraq-maypresage-future-us-role.html?_r=0 (stating that daily firefights between U.S. and ISIL forces are becoming
"routine [ ]").
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OPERATION INHERENT
RESOLVE

* Several theories have been offered to justify the use of force by the United States
against ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria (and later, also in Libya). This section focuses on
four of those theories upon which the United States could rely in claiming that
Operation Inherent Resolve complies with international law: United Nations Security
Council authorization, invitation to intervene, humanitarian intervention, and selfdefense.
A. Security CouncilAuthorization
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations-"[t]he pivot on which the
present-day jus ad bellum hinges"" -contains a prohibition on the threat or use of
force among member States. This foundational prohibition is only subject to two
exceptions: The "inherent" right of individual or collective self-defense under Article
51 of the Charter and enforcement measures carried out by, or through the
authorization of, the UN Security Council.
Article 42 of the UN Charter allows the Security Council to authorize the use of
force "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security"
when alternative methods of resolution have proven inadequate." So far the Security
Council has passed two resolutions addressing the threat posed by ISIS. Resolution
2178 declares terrorism "one of the most serious threats to international peace and
security,"o but leaves out the essential force authorization language of "all necessary
means."91
This language, "all necessary means," has appeared in all the Security Council
resolutions that authorized member States to use military force. It resurfaced,
however, in November 2015 when the Security Council unanimously passed
Resolution 2249. Paragraph 5 of that resolution provides that the Security Council,
[c]alls upon Member States that have the capacity to do so to take all
necessary measures, in compliance with international law, in particular with
the United Nations Charter, as well as international human rights, refugee
and humanitarian law, on the territory under the control of ISIL .. . in Syria
and Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent and suppress
terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL . . . and all other individuals,
groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and other
terrorist groups ... and to eradicate the safe haven they have established
over significant parts of Iraq and Syria.9 2

88.

YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 87 (2011).

89. U.N. Charter art. 42.
90. S.C. Res. 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014).
91. Olivia Gonzalez, Comment, The Pen and the Sword: Legal Justifications for the United States'
Engagement Against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 39 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 130, 141-42 (2015).
92. S.C. Res. 2249, para. 5 (Nov. 20,2015).
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However, while historically the phrase "all necessary measures" has been
considered as tantamount to an authorization to use armed force, 93 several challenges
face those who may wish to rely on Resolution 2249 as a legal basis to use force against
ISIS. For starters, the Resolution does not "authorize" member States to take all
necessary measures. 9 4 Nor does it even use the verb "decide" that would indicate a
Security Council exercising its authority to adopt a decision that would be binding on
all the member States.95 Rather, the resolution simply "calls upon Member States" to
act.96 As Dapo Akande and Marko Milanovic note, "[t]his difference in language itself
suggests that though the Council contemplates, and perhaps would even welcome, the
use of force by [S]tates, it does not authorize such action." 7 Equally significant is that
"for the resolution to have those [binding and operative] effects the Council must
actually decide to do something or to authorize something." 98 Calling upon States to
take action is entirely different from authorizing States to so act, and thus Resolution
2249 has little, if any, operative impact." Moreover, in contradistinction to previous
Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of force, which have invoked the
Security Council's authority under Chapter VII of the Charter (e.g., by incorporating
the phrase "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter"),'" Resolution 2249 is silent on
the matter and Chapter VII is nowhere mentioned.o1 The absence of any such mention
of Chapter VII, it is argued, means that a Security Council authorization to use force
is, at least at present, off the table.10 2 Thus, as Ashley Deeks argues, while "[m]ost
UNSCRs that authorize force ... contain a preambular paragraph that specifically
93. Paulina Starski, 'Legitimized Self-Defense' - Quo Vadis Security Council?, BLOG EUR. J. INT'L L.
(Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/legitimized-self-defense-quo-vadis-security-council/
[https://
perma.cc/5T7X-WENM].
94. See id. (noting that the Resolution does not authorize all measures due to lack of certain required
language).
95. See Nicolas Boeglin, Arguments Based on UN Resolution 2249 in Prime Minister's Report on
Airstrikes in Syria: Some Clarifications Needed, HUM. RTS. INVESTIGATIONS (Dec. 4, 2015), https://
humanrightsinvestigations.org/2015/12/04/arguments-based-on-un-resolution-2249-in-prime-ministersreport-on-airstrikes-in-syria-some-clarifications-needed/ [https://perma.cc/N5Q9-9A6L] (explaining that
the lack of the word "decide" means there is no specific authorization for the use of force).
96. S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 92, para. 5.
97. Dapo Akande & Marko Milanovic, The Constructive Ambiguity of the Security Council's ISIS
Resolution, BLOG EUR. J. INT'L L. (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-constructive-ambiguity-ofthe-security-councils-isis-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/CSL2-Z2KY].
98. Id. (emphasis omitted).
99. See Harriet Moynihan, Assessing the Legal Basis for UK Military Action in Syria, ROYAL INST.
INT'L AFF. (Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/assessing-legal-basis-ukmilitary-action-syria [https://perma.cc/TU7J-MBYV] ("In order to provide legal authority for the use of
force against ISIS under international law, a Security Council resolution would need to constitute a decision,
taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that states could use all necessary measures in their action
against ISIS. Although resolution 2249 determines that ISIS is a 'global and unprecedented threat to
international peace and security' and refers to 'all necessary measures', the language used in the operative
part of the resolution is merely hortatory ('calls upon') and does not refer to Chapter VII. For those who
are looking for specific UN authorization for the use of force, this is not it.").
100. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (stating that the Security Council is "[a]cting under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations"); S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (demonstrating the reference to
Chapter VII of the UN Charter).
101. See generally S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 92, para. 5.
102. See Sharmine Narwani, Breaking International Law in Syria, RT (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.rt.comlop-edge/323396-unsc-isis-syria-us/ [https://perma.ccIW3KK-KWWB] (arguing that the
lack of Chapter VII language in the Resolution means that use of force is not in accordance with
international law unless States have other means to render use of force compliant).
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invokes Chapter VII[,] ... use the word 'decides' as the active verb in the paragraph
that authorizes force [, and] ... use the term 'all necessary means' or 'all necessary
measures' as the code for force authorization."'o Only the third of these elements is
present in Resolution 2249, making it clear that the Resolution "is not intended1 04
to
serve as a stand-alone authorization for using force against ISIS in Syria and Iraq."
What, then, is the significance of Resolution 2249 according to this view? For
those who reject the position that the resolution authorizes member States to use force
against ISIS, the resolution is nothing more than a restatement that member States
may only use force against ISIS if, and only if, they are already permitted to do so
legally, namely in exercising their inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter."-' In fact, Resolution 2249 may also be
construed as suggesting that "if a state has a legal basis, compatible with the UN
Charter, to take military action, and if it has capacity to do so, then it is encouraged to
act.""' According to this view, the resolution legitimizes "the options taken by major
stakeholders involved in the Syrian conflict"107 without giving any further legal
authorization to such actions. It is also worth noting that Resolution 2249 "dodges the
question of whether outsiders can use force against IS in Syria without the explicit
permission of the Syrian government. " 8 Such a crucial question is highly unlikely to
have gone unaddressed in a resolution authorizing military force.
The combination of the factors noted above has led many to conclude that
Resolution 2249 reflects a political compromise that prevents any reading of that
resolution as independently authorizing force against ISIS in Syria or Iraq. As Ashley
Deeks notes,
Russia is acting against ISIS in Syria with Assad's consent, and asserts that
other bases for using force in Syria are inconsistent with international law.
The United States, France, Canada, Australia, Turkey, and other states are
using force in Syria on a theory of collective self-defense of Iraq or of
national self-defense or both. OP5 neither rejects nor accepts the legitimacy
of any particular legal theory. Instead, it indicates approval for states to use
force in Syria and Iraq as long as that force is consistent with the UN
Charter. That allows states to continue to rely on their existing theories for

103. Ashley Deeks, Threadingthe Needle in Security Council Resolution 2249, LAWFARE (Nov. 23, 2015,
[https://
https://www.lawfareblog.com/threading-needle-security-council-resolution-2249
3:25
PM),
perma.cc/96UV-K7GM].
104. Id.
105. See Marc Weller, PermanentImminence of Armed Attacks: Resolution 2249 (2015) and the Right to
Self Defence Against Designated Terrorist Groups, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
permanent-imminence-of-armed-attacks-resolution-2249-2015-and-the-right-to-self-defence-againstdesignated-terrorist-groups/ [https://perma.cc/LZS2-JVEC] (stating that the Resolution cannot authorize
use of force beyond what is already permitted and giving the example of France's use of Article 51 in the
aftermath of the Paris attacks).
106. Moynihan, supra note 99.
107. Peter Hilpold, The Fight Against Terrorism and SC Resolution 2249 (2015): Towards a More
Hobbesian or a More Kantian International Society?, 55 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 535, 537 (2015),
http://link.springer.comarticle/10.1007/s40901-016-0028-1.
108. David Bosco, UK's ParliamentDebates What the UN Security Council Said, LAWFARE (Dec. 2,
2015, 12:24 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/uks-parliament-debates-what-un-security-council-said
[https://perma.cc/S2L5-9JA6].
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using force-which each state asserts is consistent with the Charterwithout having to resolve the legal dispute between Russia and the other
states using force.10

Yet, even if one accepts this reading of Resolution 2249, I would suggest that its
significance goes beyond the immediate issue of whether member States are
authorized by the Security Council to use force, or merely encouraged to do so based
on their individual or collective right of self-defense. For, as the resolution clearly
indicates, the target for such use of force is not a State but rather ISIS, a non-State
terrorist organization.no In acknowledging the possibility that member states will take
"all necessary measures" against such a non-State entity, the Security Council seems
to recognize that force can be legally used against terrorist groups."'
And if, as
suggested by the view above, all Resolution 2249 does is encourage member States to
exercise their right of self-defense against ISIS, then it essentially confirms that selfdefense may indeed be used against terrorist groups and similar non-State actors. This,
in and of itself, is a significant point, the true meaning of which is explored further
below.
Moreover, the view of Resolution 2249 as political encouragement, rather than
legal authorization, does not go uncontested. The resolution calls on States to
"eradicate the safe haven [ISIL has] established over significant parts of Iraq and
Syria."11 2 It is hard to construe the word "eradicate" in any way other than authorizing
military force. Furthermore, the resolution contains other allusions to Chapter VII
powers, such as the phrase "[the Council] regardsall such acts of [ISIL] terrorism as a
threat to peace and security,"" 3 which harkens back to the language appearing in
Article 39 of the Charter.1 14 Indeed, "[a]s the [International Court of Justice]'s
Namibia Advisory Opinion makes clear, "the lack of reference to Chapter VII in a
resolution does not mean that it is not to be regarded as binding nor does it mean that
the resolution does not have operative legal effect.',".
The treatment of Resolution 2249 by several member States blurs the answer to
the question of encouragement versus authorization further still. Thus, for example,
the French government has taken the view that the resolution "authorise[d] collective
self-defence [sic] against an armed attack.. . and immediately announced it was
tripling air strikes against I[SIL].""' Similarly, the German Parliament decided to

109. Deeks, supra note 103. It is noteworthy that as part of that compromise, Russia managed to add
language "protecting Bashar-al Assad's role in a political transition, [so] the text cannot be used to justify
attacking government positions." Rob Crilly, UN Approves Syria Resolution-What Does it Mean?,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/12010091/UNapproves-Syria-resolution-what-does-it-mean.html [https://perma.cc/48XA-ZWD5].
110. See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 92, para. 5 (Nov. 20, 2015) (stating that it calls on member States to
renew their efforts against ISIS, not a State organization).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. para. 1.
114. See U.N. Charter art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace . . . .").
115. Dapo Akande & Marko Milanovic, The Constructive Ambiguity of the Security Council's ISIS
Resolution, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-constructive-ambiguity-of-thesecurity-councils-isis-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/DDK9-KYFR].
116. Crilly, supra note 109.
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approve the government's formal request to send up to 1200 troops to combat ISIS.'"
The international legal basis for the deployment decision, as officially claimed by the
Government, is "collective [] self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter [as]
covered by [SC Res.] 2249 (2015). "n" In his November 2015 report to Parliament,
former British Prime Minister David Cameron adopted a more robust view of
Resolution 2249 when he quoted it, stating that, "[t]here [was] a clear legal basis for
military action against ISIL in Syria."" He then strongly implied that the existence of
the resolution would dispel the "political, legal, and military risks" that would
otherwise come from using force against ISIS.120 Following the Prime Minister's lead,
Parliament voted (by a 397-223 margin) to approve airstrikes against ISIS in Syria
despite the earlier view of many members that such action could not, in fact, be legally
justified.'2 1 Since then, "the UK [and] the United States [have joined] in bombing ISIS
targets throughout Syria."12 2 However, for its part, the United States has not relied
expressly on Resolution 2249 to justify its military operations against ISIS in Iraq and
Syria.12 3
B. Invitation to Intervene
Customary international law incorporates the principle of non-intervention in
24
other States' internal affairs as a reflection of respect for their sovereignty.1 However,
international law recognizes a qualified right of a government to request foreign
assistance, including by way of military intervention, to suppress rebels acting against
the government.1 25 The invitation doctrine allows a foreign State to "legally send
26
troops to another State upon invitation for certain limited operations."1
1 In a speech given on April 1, 2016 before the annual meeting of the American
Society of International Law, Brian Egan, the State Department Legal Advisor, stated:
As a matter of international law, the United States has relied on both
consent. and self-defense in its use of force against
ISIL .... Beginning in the summer of 2014, the United States'

117. Anne Peters, German ParliamentDecides to Send Troops to Combat ISIS-Based on Collective SelfDefense "in Conjunction with" SC Res. 2249, EJIL: TALK! (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/germanparlament-decides-to-send-troops-to-combat-isis- %E2% 88 %92-based-on-collective-self-defense-inconjunction-with-sc-res-2249/ [https://perma.cc/2J89-LAJT].
118. Id.
119. Memorandum.to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Prime Minister's Response to the Foreign
Affairs Select Committee's Second Report of Session 2015-16: The Extension of Offensive British Military
Operations to Syria 15 (Nov. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
data/file/480073/PMResponse.to FAC.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS3S-83S6].
120. Id.
121. Michael P. Scharf, How the War Against ISIS ChangedInternationalLaw, 48 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 15, 65 (2016).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 66.
124. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
125. See id. arts. 39-51 (discussing UN procedures for requesting military assistance with respect to
"threat[s] to the peace, breach[es] of the peace, [and] act[s] of aggression").
126. Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of MilitaryIntervention by Invitationof the Government,
56 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 189,189 (1985).
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actions in Iraq against ISIL have been premised on Iraq's request for,
and consent to, U.S. and coalition military action against ISIL on
Iraq's territory in order to help Iraq prosecute the armed conflict
against the terrorist group."'
Indeed, the Iraqi Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi acknowledged that his country
had "asked for help from many countries that we have a strategic relationship with,
and that includes the United States .... We are in a state of war, and we look to our
friends to help us in this confrontation."128 In a letter submitted by the government of
Iraq to the Security Council on September 20, 2014, Iraq states,
[W]e, in accordance with international law and the relevant bilateral
and multilateral agreements, and with due regard for complete
national sovereignty and the Constitution, have requested the United
States of America to lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and
military strongholds, with our express consent. The aim of such
strikes is to end the constant threat to Iraq, protect Iraq's citizens and,
ultimately, arm Iraqi forces and enable them to regain control of
Iraq's borders. 1 29
However, relying exclusively on Iraq's invitation would permit a narrower course of
conduct than the United States would likely prefer,13 since under this theory, the
continuation of U.S. military operations against ISIS will depend on Iraq's on-going
consent, which, as Ashley Deeks correctly notes, "it could withdraw."13 ' Moreover, as
the International Court of Justice held in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo v. Uganda
case, when one State gives its consent to another to carry out military operations in the
territory of the former, such operations must be limited and restricted within the
parameters of such consent. 132
No express invitation has been extended to the United States, unlike Russia,
which was asked by Syria to act against ISIS forces."' Although some have argued
that the United States might claim Syrian "implied consent" based upon the Syrian
government's passivity in allowing U.S. operations on and in Syrian territory,'3 4 the
127. Egan, supra note 1.
128. Missy Ryan, U.S. Urges Iraq to Ensure CoalitionAid is Effective Against Islamic State, WASH. POST
(Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/us-urges-iraq-to-ensure-coalition-aidis-effective-against-islamic-state/2015/03/09/8ef90302-c67a-11e4-b2al-bedlaaea2816_story.html
[https://
perma.cc/XED9-LSMQ].
129. Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the U.N., Letter dated Sep. 20,2014 from the Permanent Rep. of Iraq to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc, S/2014/691 (Sept. 22,
2014).
130. Ashley Deeks, U.S. Airstrikes Against ISIS in Syria? Possible International Legal Theories,
LAWFARE (Aug. 23, 2014, 3:04 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-airstrikes-against-isis-syria-possibleinternational-legal-theories [https://perma.cc/8BPT-LHTL].
131. Id.
132. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005
I.C.J. Rep. 168, para. 52 (Dec. 19).
133. Douglas Cantwell, The ETFand the Legality of US. Intervention in Syria Under InternationalLaw,
LAWFARE (Mar. 28, 2016, 9:28 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/etf-and-legality-us-intervention-syria-underinternational-law [https://perma.cc/F2DR-X8JL]; Bill Chappell, Russia Begins Airstrikes in Syria after
Assad's Request, NPR (Sept. 30, 2015), http://npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/09/30/444679327/russiabegins-conducting-airstrikes-in-syria-at-assads-request.
134. Louise Arimatsu & Michael Schmitt, The Legal Basis for the Wat againstISIS Remains Contentious,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/06/legal-basis-war-isis-
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notion of "implied invitation" is not accepted in international law and would be
1 35
particularly dangerous due to its inherent manipulability.
Traditionally, only the established, internationally recognized government can
extend such an invitation. Thus, while international law permits a country to intervene
in a fellow nation on the request of that fellow nation's government, the validity of a
request by the Libyan government is complicated by the fact that there are currently
rival governments in Libya, namely the Government of National Accord (GNA) and
13
the House of Representatives (HoR).1 36 The GNA is backed by the United Nations, 1
38
while the HoR has some western support, including France. While the GNA appears
to be the stronger of the two governments, "on the domestic front, the GNA still has
to gain recognition and earn its legitimacy from many -including the powerful eastern
tribes and ... the most powerful man in the country, General Haftar.""' The GNA
requested foreign assistance,14 0 but the U.S. airstrikes have been declared "illegal and
unconstitutional" by members of the HoR."' While the United States argues that the
GNA has been characterized as "the internationally recognized government of
Libya,"14 2 if it "still lacks power within the country and has been unable to create a
truly national unified government[,]" it is a dubious claim to suggest the GNA has the
43
Indeed, while
authority under international law to request foreign assistance.1
... specifically
the
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of
head
"the
that
noted
Cook
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the U.S.
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to
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syria-islamic-state [https://perma.cc/9ZRP-FT46].
135. See Eliav Lieblich, Intervention and Consent: Consensual Forcible Interventions in InternalArmed
Conflicts as InternationalAgreements, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 337, 349-50 (2011) (stating that interventions
without explicit consent "raise difficult questions, particularly regarding whether the consent was freely
given").
136. Ken Hanly, Op-Ed: Why Did the U.S. Decide to Bomb ISIS in Libya?, DIG. J. (Aug. 9, 2016),
http://www.digitaljournal.com/nelys/world/op-ed-why-did-usa-decide-to-bomb-the-islamic-state-in-sirtelibya/article/472102 [https://perma.cc/NY5Y-6YJQ].
137. Id.
138. Id. ("[R]ecently the French have been discovered as supporting the [GNA] rival House of
Representatives (HoR) government and its forces under General Haftar. Three French agents were killed
when a helicopter crashed or was shot down while on a reconnaissance mission for Haftar."); John Pearson,
French Support of Rival GeneralThreatensLibya's UN-Backed Government, NATIONAL (July 23,2016, 1:48
http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/french-support-of-rival-general-threatens-libyas-unPM),
backed-government [https://perma.cc/AA74-J35Z] ("The GNA is struggling to control the capital in the
country's west .... The realisation that Gen Hafter has French backing further undermines its credibility,
leaving Libyans on all sides questioning whether it should stay in office.").
139. Guitta, supra note 78.
140. Id. ("The [U.S.] bombing [campaign] was in response to the request of the Government of National
Accord (GNA), whose Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj had previously said Libya did not need foreign
intervention.").
141. Reda Elhadi Fhelboom & Jacob Wirtschafter, Libya Discord Threatens to Overshadow Military
Successes Against Islamic State, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/
aug/11/libya-discord-threatens-to-overshadow-military-suc/ [https://perma.cc/S99S-7X39].
142. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Def., Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press
Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.defense.gov/News/
TranscriptsfTranscript-View/Article/882676/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-presssecretary-peter-cook-in [https:/perma.cc/Z333-B4UV] (quoting Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook).
143. Hanly, supra note 136.
144. Press Release, supra note 142; see also Timm, supra note 79.
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government, perhaps due to the uncertain status of the GNA within Libya, has not
relied solely on the GNA's request to justify its intervention.
C HumanitarianIntervention
The United States's first air strikes against ISIS came on the heels of news reports
describing the critical condition of tens of thousands of Yazidis trapped on Mount
Sinjar.14 ' Michael Scharf suggests that such military actions could have been framed in
terms of humanitarian intervention.'" However, from a legal standpoint, arguments
about humanitarian intervention are rather weak since, under positive international
law, unilateral humanitarian intervention (i.e., one carried out by a State or a group of
States without an authorization from the UN Security Council) is unlawful."'
Unilateral humanitarian intervention does not fulfil the conditions for a lawful
self-defense,' 48 and, by definition, it lacks Security Council approval. Since these are
the only two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4), the
UN Charter does not recognize a unilateral right of a member State to use force against
another, regardless of the aims of such intervention. The International Court of Justice
accepted this position in its decision in the Nicaraguav. United States case holding that
the United States could not invoke Nicaragua's human rights record to justify
American military activities.'4 9 However, this state of affairs creates a sharp schism
between the strictures of positive international law and the need to address urgent
humanitarian appeals and prevent or stop mass atrocities. As Thomas Franck argues,
"the law's legitimacy is surely [] undermined if, by its slavish implementation, it
produces terrible consequences. The paradox arises from the seemingly irreconcilable
choice, in such hard cases, between consistency and justice.""so
While this paradox has led some proponents of humanitarian intervention to
couch their arguments in moral terms, seeking to bypass "capricious legalistic

145. Helene Cooper, Mark Lander, & Alissa J. Rubin, Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/obama-weighs-militarystrikes-to-aid-trapped-iraqis-officials-say.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5GLX-TSXX].
146. Scharf, supra note 121, at 55-62.
147. Oren Gross, Applying the Extra-Legal MeasuresModel to HumanitarianInterventions: A Reply to
Devon Whittle, 26 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 699, 701 (2015).
148. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN andthe Use of Force: LegalAspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-6 (1999).
149. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, para. 129 (June 27); see also Nigel S. Rodley, Human Rights and HumanitarianIntervention: The
Case Law of the World Court, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 321, 332 (1989). But see Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising
Policy Objections to HumanitarianIntervention, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1013 (1998) (interpreting the
ICJ's ruling as merely finding that, in the particular circumstances before the ICJ, there was no right of
intervention in support of an opposition within another state because states had not justified their conduct
by reference to a new right of intervention, and thus there was no possibility of demonstrating the emergence
of a new customary norm on the matter).
150. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED
ATrACKS 175 (2002).
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53
52
logomachy""' by direct appeals to moral legitimacy, I have suggested elsewhere
that the extra-legal measures model, which I developed in the context of emergency
powers,1 5 4 could be utilized to offer an alternative for States to undertake unilateral
humanitarian intervention while, at the same time, maintaining the strong principle of
prohibiting the use of force and the integrity of the UN Charter's collective security
system."' This model involves the possibility that when the circumstances on the
ground are truly exceptional, the Security Council is unwilling or unable to act, and no
other alternatives for action exist, unilateral action could be undertaken. Such action
would violate international law, and a state would acknowledge that violation, rather
than attempting Orwellian legal interpretations, reasoning, and justifications for
action.
The debate surrounding the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention was
rekindled just as this Article went to print. On April6, 2017, U.S. destroyers launched
59 Tomahawk missiles against a Syrian airfield from which the Syrian regime had
15 6
In the aftermath of the attacks, a
earlier conducted a cheiical weapons attack.
humanitarian intervention of the
unilateral
of
support
in
argued
of
scholars
number
kind carried out by the United States." Others reiterated the view that unilateral
humanitarian intervention is illegal under existing international law."' For my part, I

151. NIKOLAOs K. TSAGOURIAS, JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE HUMANITARIAN

DIMENSION 64 (2000).
152. See, e.g., Michael J. Smith, HumanitarianIntervention. An Overview of the EthicalIssues, 12 ETHICS
& INT'L AFF. 63, 75-79 (1998) ("I regard it still as a moral imperative to prevent or mitigate evil when one
has the capacity to do so. Thus as an ethical imperative, the issue of humanitarian intervention demands
our deepest attention and response."); ALLEN BUCHANAN, HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGITIMACY, AND THE USE
OF FORCE 298 (2010) ("Most would agree that the international legal system has undergone significant
moral improvements since 1945.").
153. See generally Oren Gross, Applying the Extra-LegalMeasuresModel to HumanitarianInterventions:
A Reply to Devon Whittle, 26 EUR. J. INT'L L. 699 (2015).
154. See generally Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?,112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003).
155. See also Michael Byers, Letting the Exception Prove the Rule, 17 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 9, 16 (2003)
(suggesting that the mitigation approach (a sub-category of ELM) is not intended to provide an alternative
system for regulating the use of force in international affairs; it simply recognizes that circumstances will
invariably arise when the existing rules cannot be made to work-in such circumstances, it seems unwise to
change longstanding and largely effective rules to accommodate the exception, rather than simply letting
the exception prove the rule).
156. Michael D. Shear, U.S. Missile Attack on Syria: What We Know and Don't Know, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/what-we-kiiow-and-dont-know-about-the-syriaairstrikes.html?_r=0.
157. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Hoh, Not Illegal: But Now the Hard PartBegins, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 7,
2017, 6:09 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/39695/illegal-hard-part-begins/ [https://perma.cc/9UWZ-F557]
(arguing that the Trump administration must "use whatever opening may be created by the strike to pivot
to a longer-term 'smart power' approach to Syrian diplomacy"); Jens David Ohlin, Two Visions of the UN
Charter, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 13, 2017, 11:50 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/13/two-visions-of-the-uncharter/ [https://perma.cc/68M4-CE2C] ("I don't think that international security is promoted and enhanced
when we give a free pass to allow governments to mistreat their own citizens, and treat this as a 'lesser
problem'-subject only to non-military measures-than the problem of international conflict, which is
subject to unilateral military measures.").
158. E.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Why Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Is Illegal and Potentially
Criminal, OPINIo JURIS (Apr. 20, 2017, 3:46 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/20/against-unilateralhumanitarian-intervention-and-why-it-can-be-criminal [https://perma.cc/T8YN-MNG4]; Ryan Goodman,
HumanitarianMilitary Optionsfor Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack: "Illegal but not Unprecedented",JUST
SECURITY (Apr. 6, 2017, 9:56 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/39658/humanitarian-military-options-
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remain steadfast in the position that the American military action was, indeed,
unlawful yet, much like its 1999 Kosovo precursor, legitimate and morally justified.

D. Self-Defense
Article 51 of the Charter states that, "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a [member State], until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security."" The United States has relied on the
doctrines of individual and collective self-defense to justify its military operations
against ISIS under international law. In his speech before the American Society of
International Law (ASIL) at its annual meeting, Brian Egan commented that, "[u]pon
commencing air strikes against ISIL in Syria in September 2014, the United States
submitted a letter to the UN Security Council explaining the international legal basis
for our use of force in Syria in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter."6 In
the letter mentioned, which was submitted to the President of the Security Council on
September 23, 2014, the United States noted that, "States must be able to defend
themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective selfdefense, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, when, as is the case here, the
government of the State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent
the use of its territory for such attacks."16 1

1.

The Inherent Right of Individual or Collective Self-Defense

The United States, like all other States who submitted similar letters to the
Security Council, invoked primarily the right of collective self-defense based on an
explicit request by the government of Iraq for military assistance in its fight against
62
ISIS.1
For its part, Iraq, the target of numerous armed attacks by ISIS, invoked its
inherent right of individual self-defense and requested military assistance by other

countries. 163
Interestingly, in his ASIL speech, Brian Egan suggested:
Consistent with the inherent right of individual and collective selfdefense, the United States initiated necessary and proportionate
actions in Syria against ISI[S] . . . although the United States
maintains an individual right of self-defense against ISI[S], it has not
syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-illegal-unprecedented/ [https://perma.cc/N6BC-K5WR]. For a summary of
the various positions, see generally Rebecca Ingber, InternationalLaw is Failing Us in Syria, JUST SECURITY
(Apr. 12, 2017, 11:06 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/39895/international-law-failing-syria/ [https://
perma.cclN2NZ-PSDH].
159. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
160. Egan, supra note 1.
161. Scharf, supra note 121, at 34.
162. See infra Section II.D.3 for discussion of those letters.
163. Missy Ryan, U.S. Urges Iraqto Ensure CoalitionAid Is Effective Against IslamicState, WASH. POST
(Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle east/us-urges-iraq-to-ensure-coalition-aidis-effective-against-islanic-state/2015/03/09/8ef9O3O2-c67a-1le4-b2al-bedlaaea2816_story.html
[https://
perma.cc/8W68-SB5S].
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relied solely on that international law basis in taking action against
ISI[S]. In Iraq, U.S. operations against ISI[S] are conducted with
Iraqi consent and in furtherance of Iraq's own armed conflict against
the group. And in Syria, U.S. operations against ISI[S] are conducted
in individual self-defense and the collective self-defense of Iraq and
other States.
However, despite the repeated mention of the United States's right of individual selfdefense, Brian Egan has not elaborated further on the factual and legal bases behind
its invocation, leaving one to wonder what precisely is the armed attack perpetrated
by ISIS against the United States that would justify the exercise of that inherent right
of self-defense.
At the time Brian Egan made his speech, it seems that the only events that could
have conceivably amounted to armed attacks by ISIS against the United States would
have been the 2014 beheadings of two American journalists,'65 the 2015 attack in San
Bernardino, 16 6 and the 2016 attack in Orlando, 167 though there is still "no consensus on
what type of attack by a non-state actor against a sovereign state could trigger the
latter's right of self-defense." 16 8 More likely, the United States would have argued that
its military intervention in Syria and Iraq was justified on the basis of preemptive selfdefense.'69 The United States has taken the approach that terrorists, by their nature,
"pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people." 7 o Specifically, as of
April 2016, ISIS had attacked U.S. citizens both abroad and within the United States,
and the organization continued to grow in wealth, territory, and power, as well as
made "credible threats . .. against the United States."'72 However, as Marty Lederman
notes:

-

164. Egan, supra note 1.
165. Greg Miller, FBI Director: U.S. Has Identified the Killer of Two Beheaded American Journalists,
WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-fbi-director4
2 44
- dd-1le
says-us-has-identified-the-killer-of-two-beheaded-american-joumalists/2014/09/25/8ff5205
9al5-137aa0153527_story.html [https://perma.cc/88NG-QYB8].
166. Missy Ryan et al., Both San BernardinoAttackers PledgedAllegiance to the Islamic State, Officials
2
Say, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/1 /08/both[https://perma.cc/LHJ7san-bernardino-attackers-pledged-allegiance-to-the-islamic-state-officials-say
RW3L].
167. Jared Malsin, What We Know About ISIS's Role in the Orlando Shooting, TIME (June 12, 2016),
http://time.com/4365507/orlando-shooting-isis-claims-responsibility-terror/ [https://perma.cc/N8YF-B9L3]
("ISIS claimed responsibility for the mass shooting attack in an Orlando gay club on Sunday that left at least
50 people dead.").
168. Milena Sterio, The Legality of ISIS Air Strikes Under InternationalLaw, INTLAwGRRLS (Sept. 12,
[https://perma.cc/
2014), https://ilg2.org/2014/09/12/the-legality-of-isis-air-strikes-under-international-law/
2SAA-7BLH].
169. See Gonzalez, supra note 91, at 151 (noting that the United States would have been required to
show a threat to personnel or global peace to obtain approval).
170. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (May 23,
2013), https://www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-nationaldefense-university.
171. See Gonzalez, supra note 91, at 149 ("The growing wealth and territorial expansion of ISIS has led
the United States to view it as a credible national security threat."). This trend has now reversed. Sarah
Almukhtar et al., ISIS Has Lost Many of the Key Places It Once Controlled, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/18/world/middleeast/isis-control-places-cities.html?_r=2.
172. Gonzalez, supra note 91, at 150; see Jim Michaels, Islamic State Releases Video ThreateningAttack
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Because ISI[S] has not yet actually engaged in an armed attack
against the United States, this assertion suggests that the U.S. believes
that ISI[S]'s presence in Syria presents an "imminent" threat of an
attack on the United States. This might or might not be correct; but,
as far as I know, the government has not (yet) publicly offered any
specific evidence .. . to support such an "imminent threat of attack on

the U.S." theory.173
Jack Goldsmith suggests that Brian Egan's speech constitutes the
final stage of the Obama administration's normalization of oncecontroversial Bush-era doctrines about the conduct of war .... [T]he
Obama administration[] official[ly] embraced the same preemption
doctrine that justified the invasion of Iraq .... If anything, Egan
announces a broader principle than Bush's, since he (unlike the Bush
team) applies it in the context of threats short of the weapons of mass
destruction that motivated Bush. 17 4
Daniel Bethlehem rejects Goldsmith's hypothesis, claiming that, "the policy
[Egan] outlined ... is some distance, and materially different, from the broad,
unilateralist brush of the Bush doctrine of preemption and its associated policies of the
non-application of the jus in bello and the global war on terror.""' Bethlehem believes
the imminence elements outlined by Egan provide "a more rigorous and transparent
framework of legal enquiry for assessing whether a State had a right to use force by
way of anticipatory self-defence in the face of a threat from a non-State actor," which
contrasts strongly with the Bush administration approach of "invent[ing] new
language .. . suggest[ing] that the United States was moving away ... from established
tenets of international law."17 6 To Bethlehem, Egan's speech outlined a policy that
ensured continued compliance with "the last resort character of the use of force and
the principles of necessity and proportionality."'

on New York City, USA TODAY (Nov. 19,2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/11/18/isilreleases-video-threatening-attack-new-york-city/76021908/ [https://perma.cc/MXG2-7XZ8] (reporting that
ISIS "released a new propaganda video threatening attacks on New York City ... [and] also released a video
threatening to attack Washington, D.C., in the wake of the Paris attacks").
173. Marty Lederman, ASIL Speech by State Legal Adviser Egan on InternationalLaw and the Use of
ForceAgainst ISIL, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 4,2016, 6:06 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/30377/asil-speechstate-legal-adviser-intemational-law-basis-for-limits-on-force-isil/ [https://perma.cc/6UXZ-J3ZG].
174. Jack Goldsmith, Obama Has Officially Adopted Bush's Iraq Doctrine, TIME (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://time.com/4283865/obama-adopted-bushs-iraq-doctrinel [https://perma.cc/4JG4-ZDD5]. Goldsmith's
greater concern, however, is that "the fact that [the preemption theory] is articulated by an administration
known to be friendly to international law . .. will be influential," allowing future U.S. and global leaders to
"[not] invoke the doctrine used in the disastrous Iraq war[, but instead] adopt the functionally identical
principle that the Obama administration normalized and legitimated." Id.
175. Daniel Bethlehem, Not By Any Other Name: A Response to Jack Goldsmith on Obama's
Imminence, LAWFARE (Apr. 7, 2016, 1:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/not-any-other-nameresponse-jack-goldsmith-obamas-imminence [https://perma.cc/HQG6-VVQE].
176. Id.
177. Id.
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May a State Legally Exercise Force in Self-Defense Against a NonState Actor?

Traditionally, the UN Charter provisions that handle use of force are premised
on States using force against other States."' However, the rapidly growing capabilities

9
Interpretations of
of non-State actors have challenged these traditional notions."

Article 51 range from permitting,"' not expressly prohibiting,"' and prohibiting use of
force without Security Council approval against non-State actors.182

In his ASIL speech, Brian Egan stated the United States's official position that,
"the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense recognized in the UN
8
Charter is not restricted to threats posed by States."' ' However, this position seems

to run against the decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ
famously defined "armed attack" in its 1986 Nicaragua case as including actions by
regular armed forces across an international border as well as "the sending by a State
of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its
scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere

frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces."14 The criticisms of
the Court's "scale and effects" language (criticisms which I share) notwithstanding,"
the Court makes it absolutely clear that for there to be an "armed attack" for the
purposes of Article 51, the relevant military operation must be attributable to a
State.' In its 2004 Legal Consequences of the Constructionof a Wall in the Occupied

178. See, e.g., Olivia Flasch, The Legality of the Air Strikes Against ISIL in Syria: New Insights on the
ExtraterritorialUse of Force Against Non-State Actors, 3 J. ON USE FORCE & INT'L L. 37, 39 (2016) ("Does
Article 51, then, extend to collective self defence against non-state actors .. . ?").
179. Id. at 49; see also Kimberley N. Trapp, Actor-Pluralism, the 'Turn to Responsibility' and the Jus ad
Bellum: 'Unwilling or Unable' in Context, 2 J. ON USE FORCE & INT'L L. 199, 205-07 (2015) (outlining
responses of the Security Council and others to non-State actors in a way that implies that non-State actors
are participants in the international legal principles of use of force).
180. Trapp, supra note 179, at 200 (explaining that a purely "inter-state-rights-based approach" is not
sustainable and that Article 51 supports consideration of a pluralism of actors); see, e.g., Annalise Lekas,
Comment, #ISIS: The Largest Threat to World Peace Trending Now, 30 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 313, 347
(2015) (arguing that the UN Charter must evolve and respond to contemporary armed attacks, such as by
non-state actors).
181. Claus Kreb, The Fine Line Between Collective Self-Defense and Intervention by Invitation:
Reflections on the Use of Force Against 'IS' in Syria, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 17, 2015, 8:45 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/20118/claus-kreb-force-isil-syria/ [https://perma.cc/94ZY-E6GK] (arguing that
Article 51 interpretation does not expressly prohibit invoking the right of self-defense to take military action
against destructive non-state actors without Security Council approval).
182. Gareth D. Williams, Piercingthe Shield of Sovereignty: An Assessment of the Legal Status of the
'Unwilling or Unable' Test, 36 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 619, 621-23 (2013); see Deborah Pearlstein, The
Unwilling Part of "Unwilling or Unable", OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 9, 2015, 3:14 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/
2015/11/09/the-unwilling-part-of-unwilling-or-unable/ [https://perma.cc/R63Z-B9QP] (asserting that the
doctrine is "irreconcilable" with Article 2(4)).
183. Egan, supra note 1; see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL 47-48 (2015)
(detailing the U.S. method of responding to an attack).
184. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, para. 195 (June 27).
185. See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE
IT 250-51 (1994) (commenting on the ICJ's "unworkable" standard to determine how much force states may
permissibly use and when they may use it to repel an armed attack).
186. Flasch, supra note 178, at 49; Kevin Jon Heller, The "Unwilling or Unable" Standard for Self-
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Palestinian Territory advisory opinion, the ICJ opined similarly that, " [article 51 of
the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the
case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not
1
claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State."m
8
The ICJ thus
rejected the contention that a victim State may respond by invoking its inherent right
of self-defense when the claim is that the relevant armed attack had been carried out
by a non-State actor.'"" The ICJ also maintained this position in DRC v. Uganda, where
it found that, "the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of a right of selfdefence by Uganda against the DRC were not present." 8 9 The Court ruled, among
other things, that Uganda had failed to prove "the involvement in [the] attacks, direct
or indirect, of the Government of the DRC. The attacks [carried out against Uganda
by a rebel group opposed to the Ugandan government with bases in the DRC] did not
emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC or on behalf of the DRC." 9 0
This position of the Court has been controversial and, I believe, was erroneous
when originally put forward, and is no longer tenable.'9 Unlike Article 2(4) of the
Charter, which refers to "Members" as both resorting to threat of, or using force,
Article 51 only speaks of a "Member" as the target of an armed attack that "occurs."' 92
No mention is made therein of the origin of that attack.'93 In her Separate Opinion in
Wall, Judge Higgins rejected the Court's strict reading of Article 51, proclaiming that,
"[t]here is... nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus stipulates that self-defence is
available only when an armed attack is made by a State."' 4 Similarly, Judge
Buergenthal declared that the Court's position was "legally dubious."'95 Furthermore,
the ICJ's 2004 advisory opinion should be examined against the background of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the international reaction to those attacks.
As Yoram Dinstein argues, "the concerted reaction of the international community in
2001" to the attacks was "the defining moment that should have dispelled all lingering
doubts concerning the application of Article 51 to non-State actors."'9
Most
significant in this context are two Security Council resolutions -Resolution 1368
(2001) and Resolution 1373 (2001)'9-both of which reaffirm the inherent right of

Defense, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2011, 2:42 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/17/the-unwilling-or-unablestandard-for-self-defense-against-non-state-actors/ [https://perma.cclC94Y-KHS3].
187. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, para. 139 (July 9).
188. But see Flasch, supra note 178, at 49 (discussing the ICJ's "ambiguous" findings and "reluctance to
pronounce" on the legality of using force in self-defense against non-state actors).
189. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005
I.C.J. Rep. 168, para. 147 (Dec. 19).
190. Id. para. 146.
191. See generally Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense
Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 244,245-46 (2011).
192. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; art. 51.
193. Sean D. Murphy, Terrorismand the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 41, 50 (2002).
194. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, para. 33 (separate opinion by Higgins, J.).
195. See id. paras. 5-6 (declaration by Buergenthal, J.) ("[Tihe United Nations Charter, in affirming the
inherent right of self-defence, does not make its exercise dependent upon an armed attack by another
State . . . .").
196. DINSTEIN, supra note 88, at 227.

197. See id. at 228 (discussing the importance of the two Security Council resolutions).

2017] UNRESOLVED LEGAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

245

1 8
individual or collective self-defense against Al-Qaeda,' as well as the North Atlantic
Council decision to consider the 9/11 attacks as falling within the ambit of Article 5 of
19
the Washington Treaty (later clarified to be the North Atlantic Treaty)," which
proclaims that an armed attack against one NATO member is considered as an attack
2 00
Indeed, recognizing the importance of these resolutions and
against all members.
20
the realities of the struggle against terrorism 1 has led other judges of the ICJ to part
20 2
Thus, in his separate opinion in DRC v. Uganda,
ways with the Court's decision.

Judge Kooijmans stated forcefully that,
a phenomenon which in present-day international relations has
unfortunately become as familiar as terrorism, viz. the almost
complete absence of government authority in the whole or part of the
territory of a State. If armed attacks are carried out by irregular
bands from such territory against a neighboring State, they are still
armed attacks even if they cannot be attributed to the territorial
State. It would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right
to self-defense merely because there is no attacker State, and the
2 03
Charter does not so require.
In yet another separate opinion, Judge Simma added:
Such a restrictive reading of Article 51 might well have reflected the
state, or rather the prevailing interpretation, of the international law
on self-defence for a long time. However, in the light of more recent
developments not only in State practice but also with regard to
accompanying opinio juris, it ought urgently to be reconsidered, also

by the Court .. . Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373
(2001) cannot but be read as affirmations of the view that large-scale
attacks by non-State actors can qualify as "armed attacks" within the
meaning of Article 51.20

&

198. See Thomas Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 839, 839-40 (2001)
(discussing the right to self-defense under the Charter); Ranj Alaaldin & Bilal Khan, Airstrikes on Isis
Targets in Syria and Iraq are Legal Under InternationalLaw, LONDON SCH. ECON.: US CTR. (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://blogs.1se.ac.uklusappblog/2014/10/01/airstrikes-on-isis-targets-in-syria-and-iraq-are-legal-underinternational-law/ [https://perma.cclK8RM-SSCN] (discussing how self-defense is used in light of Security
Council resolutions 1368 and 1373).
199. DINSTEIN, supra note 88, at 228-29.
200. Id.
201. See Rosa Brooks, Lessons for InternationalLaw from the Arab Spring, 28 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 713,
725 (2013) ("Unsurprisingly, post-9/11 counterterrorism concerns triggered the rapid emergence of
normative and legal argument for expanding the basis for using force within the territory of other states.");
Lekas, supra note 180, at 328 (acknowledging that after 9/11 there is an inherent right of self-defense against
non-state actors); John F. Murphy, InternationalLaw in Crisis: Challenges Posed by the New Terrorism
the Changing Nature of War, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 59, 66-67 (2011) (discussing how after 9/11, there
has been a shift away from the criminal justice approach as a way of handling terrorism and a shift towards
a military model of counter-terrorism); Reinold, supra note 191, at 252 (discussing how the rules governing
the use of force have changed in a post-9/11 world).
202. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, 313-14, paras. 27-29 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.) (explaining why
Judge Kooijmans disagrees with the Advisory Opinion of July 9, 2004).
203. Id. at 314, para. 30 (separate opinion by Koojimans, J.).
204. Id. at 337, para. 11 (separate opinion by Simma, J.).
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Moreover, any arguments that could have been made to the effect that in both
Resolution 1368 and Resolution 1373, the inherent right of self-defense is only referred
to in the preamble and not in the operative language of those resolutions, have been
fully and completely laid to rest with the adoption of Resolution 2249. That resolution,
as noted above, expressly accepts the possibility that member States will take "all
necessary measures" against a non-State entity,20 acknowledging that force can be
legally used against terrorist groups. Indeed, even if all that Resolution 2249 does is
encourage member States to exercise their right of self-defense against ISIS, then it is
as much as confirming that self-defense may indeed be used against terrorist groups
and similar non-State actors. In that, Resolution 2249 surely ought to confirm the
application of Article 51 to non-State actors.
3.

"Unable or Unwilling"

Even if one accepts, as suggested above, that a State may invoke its inherent right
of self-defense whenever it is subject to an armed attack, regardless of the origin of
that attack, there still remains a separate question of where the victim State may
exercise its right of self-defense. Specifically, when the armed attack is committed by
a non-State actor, may the victim State respond by military force against that actor in
the territory of another State to whom the violent actions of the non-State actor are
not attributable
and who does not give its consent to such use of force by the victim
06
2

State?

International law has long recognized the obligation of every State "not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." 207 All
States have the obligation to ensure through the exercise of due diligence that illegal
non-State actor uses of force are not emanating from their borders or, if such actions
do take place, to apprehend and punish the perpetrators of the attack. 208 Yoram
Dinstein argues that if the State from whose territory the armed attack is carried out
fails to exercise the requisite degree of due diligence, either because it is unable or
.unwilling to do so, the victim State may do that which the former State should have
done had it possessed the means and disposition to perform its duty.209 Under such
circumstances, the victim State may engage in a particular category of self-defense that
Dinstein calls extra-territorial law enforcement, i.e., "recourse in self-defence to crossborder counter-force against terrorists and armed bands ... Utopia is entitled to
enforce international law extra-territorially if and when Arcadia is unable or unwilling
to prevent repetition of that armed attack." 2 0 Under the "unable or unwilling"
doctrine, a State which is victim of an armed attack is "permitted to use force in the
territory of a host state where the host state is either 'unwilling or unable' to do so." 21
'

1

205. S.C. Res. 2249, para. 5 (Nov. 20, 2015).
206. On use of force by state consent, see generally Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and
InternationalLaw Supremacy, 54. HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2013).
207. Corfu Channel (U.K. & N. Ir. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, para. 22 (April 9).
208. Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State's Right of Self-Defense Against an
Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 770, 776 (2012); Paulina Starski,
Right to Self-Defence, Attribution and the Non-State Actor-Birth of the 'Unable and Unwilling' Standard?,
75 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 455, 474-75 (2015); DINSTEIN, supra note 88, at 269.
209. DINSTEIN, supra note 88, at 271.
210. Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
211. Williams, supra note 182, at 620. See also Ashley S. Decks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a
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2 12
In recent years, the notion of "unable or unwilling" has become "a well-settled

21 3
Ashley Deeks identifies the origins of
part of the U.S. government's legal position."

the "unable or unwilling" doctrine in the 1837 Carolinecase, in which Canadian rebels
2 14
used U.S. territory to attack British forces in Canada, and suggests numerous other
21 5
culminating in the
instances in which the doctrine was applied, even if tacitly,
Pakistan-without
Abbottabad,
in
compound
Laden's
bin
Osama
on
American raid
2 16
States view
United
the
out
set
Egan
Brian
speech,
ASIL
In
his
Pakistan's consent.
doctrine:
unwilling
or
unable
regarding the
[I]n the case of ISIL in Syria, as indicated in our Article 51 letter, we could
act in self-defense without Syrian consent because we had determined that
the Syrian regime was unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory
for armed attacks by ISIL. This "unable or unwilling" standard is, in our
view, an important application of the requirement that a State, when relying
on self-defense for its use of force in another State's territory, may resort to
force only if it is necessary to do so -that is, if measures short of force have
been exhausted or are inadequate to address the threat posed by the nonState actor emanating from the territory of another State .. . applying the
standard ensures that force is used on foreign territory without consent only
in those exceptional circumstances in which a State cannot or will not take
effective measures to confront a non-State actor that is using its territory as
2 17
a base for attacks and related operations against other States.
The United States has invoked the unable or unwilling test to justify its military
intervention in Syria. Samantha Power, the American Ambassador to the United
Nations, sent a letter to the President of the Security Council to justify U.S. air strikes

in Syria, notifying the president:
States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in
Article 51 of the UN Charter, when, as is the case here, the
government of the State where the threat is located is unwilling or
2 18
unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.
Normative Framework for ExtraterritorialSelf-Defense, 52 VA. INT'L L. REV. 483, 486 (2012) (using the
Pakistan-U.S. relationship and others as an example of how the "unable or unwilling" test is applied).
212. Douglas Cantwell, "Unwilling or Unable" in the Legal Adviser's ASIL Speech, LAWFARE (Apr. 12,
[https://
2016, 3:46 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/unwilling-or-unable-legal-advisers-asil-speech
perma.cc/ZYY3-JJHDI (citing Brian Egan's 2016 ASIL speech) ("The two criteria must be identified and
analyzed independently.").
213. Samantha Arrington Sliney, Right to Act: United States Legal Basis Under the Law of Armed
Conflict to Pursue the Islamic State in Syria, 6 U. MIAMI NAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 1,
20 (2015).
214. Decks, supra note 211, at 502.
215. Id. at 549-50 (Appendix I).
216. Murphy, supra note 201, at 69-71 (quoting John Bellinger in a 2006 speech that employs the
unwilling or unable test with respect to the United States acting against al Qaida).
217. Egan, supra note 1.
218. See Michael P. Scharf, How the War Against ISIS ChangedInternationalLaw, 48 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 15, 34, 44 (2016) (asserting that these justifications find legal basis also in the Hague Conventions
(V)); see also Johan D. van der Vyver, The ISIS Crisisand the Development of InternationalHumanitarian
Law, 30 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 531, 558 (2016) (quoting Letter from Samantha Power, U.S. Representative
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With regards to the "unable" prong of the test, Brian Egan provided concrete example
in his ASIL speech:
[I]nability perhaps can be demonstrated most plainly, for example,
where a State has lost or abandoned effective control over the portion
of its territory from which the non-State actor is operating. This is the
case with respect to the situation in Syria. By September 2014, the
Syrian government had lost effective control of much of eastern and
northeastern Syria, with much of that territory under ISIL's control.1 9
For his part, Egan relied extensively on an article published by Daniel Bethlehem, the
former principal Legal Advisor to the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which
Bethlehem suggested that inability exists when "there is a reasonable and objective
basis for concluding that the [host] state is unable to effectively restrain the armed
activities of the nonstate actor." 220 The United States also questioned how "willing"
Syria was in supporting the United States's exercise of its right of self-defense, since
ISIS had established a "safe haven" in areas of Syria. 22 1 In that respect, States may be
deemed as "unwilling" when they fail to comply with international law standards of
due diligence or reasonableness in undertaking measures to prevent or punish
dangerous internal conduct. 222

On the other hand, Sharmine Narwani questions the validity of the U.S. argument
that Syria is "unwilling and unable" to combat ISIS in light of Russia's involvement in
the country. Russia "began to launch widespread airstrikes against terrorist targets
inside Syria" on September 30, 2 0 1 5 .223 Narwani observes that "Russia is operating [in
Syria] due to a direct Syrian government appeal for assistance, [making] the Russian
military role in Syria . .. perfectly legal." 2 24 Given that Syria is able to combat ISIS visd-vis the Russian military, it becomes harder for the United States to reasonably claim
Syria is unable to strike back against ISIS. Furthermore, the fact that "the Russian
intervention has assisted the Syrian state in going on the offensive against ISIS" makes
it very difficult to claim that Syria is "unwilling" to attack ISIS.22 Thus, there is a
genuine debate over whether Syria can fairly be characterized as "unwilling or
unable." In August 2014, Ryan Goodman cited the Syrian government as stating "that
it is willing and able to cooperate with the United States in carrying out strikes against
ISIS."226 As Goodman then asks, "[w]hat is the international law when a host state
(Syria) is willing and able to deal with a nonstate group (ISIS) through military
cooperation with the threatened state (the United States), but the threatened state

to UN, to Ban Ki-Moon, U.N. Secretary-General (Sept. 23, 2014)).
219. Egan, supra note 1.
220. Bethlehem, supranote 208, at 776.
221. Tom Ruys & Luca Ferro, Divergent Views on the Content and Relevance of the Jus Ad Bellum in
Europe and the United States? The Case of the U.S. -Led Military Coalition Against 'IslamicState' 9-10 (Feb.
10, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2731597 [https://perma.cc/8L5N-SR2L].
222. See Starski, supra note 208, at 479-80 (explaining how states failing to exercise due diligence in
preventing acts of terrorism could be held accountable).
223. Narwani, supra note 102.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Ryan Goodman, InternationalLaw on Airstrikes against ISIS in Syria, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 28,
2014, 12:27 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/14414/international-law-airstrikes-isis-syrial [https://perma.cc/
Y8X8-4ZRJ].
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doesn't want to associate itself with the host state . . . ?"227 There appears to be no
international consensus on this issue. However, a counterpoint to Syria's assertion
that they are willing to cooperate is that the proper question should not be whether

Syria is willing to assist, but whether they are actually capable of effectively
suppressing ISIS on their own. Furthermore, is it appropriate to leave the capability
determination to the forum State, or should the victim State(s) be allowed to make the
evaluation? As Mahira N. Khan writes, "that the regime may be willing to tackle ISIS
is not enough to prevent Iraq or its allies from invoking the self-defense doctrine."228
This viewpoint is supported by the UN Secretary-General's statement from September
2014 that "Syria had over two years to dismantle ISIS and the [U.S.] strikes 'took place
in areasno longer under the effective controlof [the Syrian governent].229 Some have
taken this quote to be "an implicit endorsement" of U.S. actions,230 though the opinion
of the UN Secretary-General is not dispositive on the question of international

legality.
More generally, the American legal position is not without its critics and the
doctrine remains highly controversial today, with a significant number of scholars
231
The doctrine, as it is currently
rejecting it as part of international law's lex lata.
2 32
The test can easily fall into a
touted by its proponents, lacks needed limitations.
pattern of dangerous circular reasoning: If a host State does not comply with a victim
State's desired route for self-defense, then the host State is deemed "unable or

227. Id.
228. Mahira N. Khan, Legality of the WarAgainst ISIS: Still Disputable, LEGISLATION & POLICY BRIEF
(Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.legislationandpolicy.com/1697/legality-for-the-war-against-isis-still-disputable/
[https://perma.cc/7G3Y-MFLR].
229. Id. (quoting, in part, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon) (emphasis added).
230. Marc Weller, Striking ISIL: Aspects of the Law on the Use of Force,ASIL INSIGHTS (Mar. 11, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/CD4Bhttps://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/5/striking-isil-aspects-law-use-force
HWLN].
231. Flasch, supra note 178, at 52-53; Kevin Jon Heller, The Absence of Practice Supporting the
"Unwilling or Unable" Test, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 17, 2015, 2:53 PM) [hereinafter Heller, The Absence of
PracticeSupportingthe "Unwilling or Unable" Test], http://opiniojuris.org/2015/02/17/unable-unwilling-testunstoppable-scholarly-imagination/ [https://perma.cc/ML39-YF8T]; see, e.g., Starski, supra note 208, at 486
(stating that "severe doubts" remain that base the standard in international law); Jack Goldsmith, Thoughts
on the Latest Round of Johnson v. Koh, LAWFARE (Sept. 16, 2011, 8:43 AM),
[https://perma.cc/6MHA-6QV8]
https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-latest-round-johnson-v-koh
(discussing the debate over "the scope of the president's authority to target members" of terrorist groups);
see also Heller, supra note 186 (showing that for many American international law scholars, "it is
meaningless to distinguish between the lex lata and the lex ferenda-international law is simply whatever
the U.S. says it is"). For a short discussion of the opposing sides to this debate, see Kevin Jon Heller, Ashley
Deeks' Problematic Defense of the 'Unwilling or Unable' Test, OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 15, 2011),
[https://
http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/15/ashley-deeks-failure-to-defend-the-unwilling-or-unable-test/
perma.cc/X867-F44W].
232. Kinga Tibori-Szab6, The 'Unwilling or Unable'Test and the Law of Self-Defence, in FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 73, 95 (Christophe Paulussen et al. eds., 2016) (calling
for clarification of the test); Goldsmith, supra note 231 (urging that lawyers' disagreements at the margins
of the doctrine will prove to be "politically devastating"); Heller, The Absence of PracticeSupporting the
"Unwilling or Unable" Test, supra note 231; Jonathan Horowitz, Does the Unwilling/Unable Test Hang on
Territorial Control?: A Response to Michael Lewis, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 12, 2014, 2:49 PM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/14953/unwillingunable-test-hang-territorial-control-response-michael-lewis/
[https://perma.cc/3XBM-3ZG2] (advocating for a "fact-based test," rather than a "generalized rule").

250

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 52:2

unwilling."233 Moreover, at least according to the United States' official position, the
judgment as to whether a host State is, in fact, "unable or unwilling" is in the hands of
the victim State with little, if any, meaningful control or checks.234 In contrast, some
have argued that the Security Council should act as a fact-finder to determine
unwillingness or inability instead of the victim State.2" Only once the victim State
receives confirmation from the Security Council that the host State has indeed been
"unable or unwilling" may it proceed against the non-State actor operating in and from
the territory of the host State.236

'

Ashley Deeks argues that "centuries of state practice" support the unwilling or
unable doctrine.237 In the context of the fight against ISIS, several States have invoked
the doctrine to justify their use of force against the organization in Syrian territory. In
their letters to the President of the Security Council, the United States, 238 Australia, 239
and Turkey 240 have expressly invoked the "unable or unwilling" doctrine. Thus, for
example, the letter sent by Australia to the Security Council declares:
States must be able to act in self-defence when the Government of
the State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent
attacks originating from its territory. The Government of Syria has,
by its failure to constrain attacks upon Iraqi territory originating from
ISIL bases within Syria, demonstrated that it is unwilling or unable to
prevent those attacks. 24
Other countries-such as Germany 24 2 and Belgium 2 4 3-have not resorted to the
"unwilling" prong of the test, but have invoked the "unable" prong in addition to other
justifications for military operations, such as collective self-defense. Thus, for
example, the letter sent on December 10, 2015 from the Permanent Mission of
Germany to the President of the Security Council states that,
233. Brooks, supra note 201, at 728 (explaining that if a territorial state does not completely agree with
a victim state's intended self-defense tactics, then the victim state can easily label the former as "unwilling
or unable").
234. Egan, supra note 1.
235. Dawood I. Ahmed, Defending Weak States Against the "Unwilling or Unable" Doctrine of SelfDefense, 9 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 1, 26-28 (2013).
236. Id. at 27.
237. Deeks, supra note 211, at 483, 497-501.
238. Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of
the United States to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept.
23, 2014).
239. Permanent Rep. of Austl. to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 9, 2015 from the Permanent Rep. of
Australia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/693
(Sept. 9, 2015).
240. Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turk. to the U.N., Letter dated July 24, 2015
from the Charge d'Affairs a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/563 (July 24, 2015).
241. Permanent Rep. of Austl. to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 9, 2015 from the Permanent Rep. of
Australia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/693
(Sept. 9, 2015).
242. Charg6 d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the U.N., Letter dated Dec. 10, 2015
from Heiko Thoms, Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/946 (Dec. 10, 2015).
243. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belg. to the U.N., Letter dated June 7, 2016 from
B6n6dicte Frankinet, the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/523 (June 7,2016).
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"

ISIL has occupied a certain part of Syrian territory over which the
Government of the Syrian Arab Republic does not at this time
exercise effective control. States that have been subjected to armed
attack by ISIL originating in this part of Syrian territory, are
therefore justified under Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations to take necessary measures of self-defence, even without the
consent of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. 2
However, others have been unable (or unwilling) to identify consistent State
practice that reflects the test.2 45 Unlike the countries mentioned above, others, such as
Norway, 246 Denmark,2 47 and France,2 4 have only invoked the right of collective selfdefense in response to a request from the government of Iraq as justification for taking
9
Interestingly enough, in its letters to the Security
military action against ISIS."
Council, the United Kingdom has also only resorted to the argument about collective
250
The "nebulous
self-defense, without invoking the "unable or unwilling" test.
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parameters" of the doctrine make measuring State practice challenging, and consensus
of clear State practice (besides the acts of the United States) is fleeting.2 5 ' Indeed, the
argument is made that the doctrine can be, and has been, invoked in practice by
militarily strong States to push their agendas at the expense of weaker States.252 By
privileging the rights of States that have been victim to non-State actor attacks that
originate from weaker host States 253 over the sovereignty of the host States, 25 4 the
doctrine could allow victim States to breach other States' sovereignty in a manner far
greater than international law intended.2 55 If a host State does not consent to the plan
that the victim State envisions for self-defense, the classification of the host State as
"unable or unwilling" is an easy way for the victim State to proceed.25 6 Such concerns
about sovereignty and States rushing to invoke the "unable or unwilling" test have led
several scholars and practitioners to suggest that a victim State seek consent of the host
State to carry out actions against the non-State actor operating in the territory of the
host State before resorting to the "unable or unwilling test." 257 It should also be noted
that attempts to fit the test within existing international law frameworks, such as
through the principle of necessity or by indirect attribution to a State's acts,m or
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attempts to draw links and comparisons between it and the similarly legally-suspect
2
humanitarian intervention 25 9 have been rejected. 60
CONCLUSION
The United States's war against ISIS is now in its third year. It is a "most peculiar
6
"[Rlarely,"
war ... [with] an eye-watering U.S.-to-ISIS 'kill ratio' of 15,000-to-1."
262
notes Time magazine, "has the U.S. been killing so many while risking so few." Yet,
despite ISIS's recent loss of ground and territory both in Iraq and Syria, many still
question the American strategy and ultimate goals in the fight against the terrorist
organization. 263 Not less challenging are the legal questions concerning the American
military intervention, particularly in Syria and Libya, where the intervened-in State
264
has not given its consent to such use of force in its territory. The military intervention
raises vexing questions both on the domestic and international planes. As this Article
has shown, there is a plausible case to be made that the intervention is justified by
Security Council Resolution 2249. In addition, international law, as it currently stands,
has clearly moved away from the position that States may not exercise their inherent
right of self-defense in circumstances in which the armed attacked against them has
been perpetrated by a non-State actor whose actions cannot be attributed to any other
State. The option to exercise self-defense (or, more likely, collective self-defense) is
available to the United States, as well as to other countries carrying the fight to ISIS,
on the basis that countries such as Syria are unable or unwilling to fight ISIS.
2
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